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 Abstract 
 
Do candidates adopt very similar Left-Right policy positions, i.e. converge, under two-
party plurality rule elections? If this is indeed the case, what are the logical consequences 
of primary contests on candidates’ policy positioning in general elections?  In particular, 
do competitive primary elections lure eventual nominees towards the center of the distri-
bution of their parties’ supporters, that is, towards more extreme policy positions than are 
held by the average voter in the general electorate, which in turn commits eventual nomi-
nees to take more extreme positions in the general elections? The paper addresses each of 
these questions, and arrives at three critical findings. First, a candidate increases her 
chances of victory if she is closer to her constituency’s mean citizen position than her 
competitor, thus supporting the Relative Convergence Hypothesis.  The second conclu-
sion confirms that divisive primaries do indeed hurt candidates in securing victory in 
their general elections.  However, the third hypothesis only receives limited support, that 
asserts that divisive primaries harm candidates because they induce candidates to adopt 
more extreme positions.  The Democratic candidates follow this tendency while the Re-
publicans do not. This pattern reflects a temporal feature of the study that during this pe-
riod “New Democrat” ideology, associated with policy centrism, was rising in influence 
in the Democratic Party. These findings have implications for our understanding of party 
strategies and political representation.   
 
 
 
 
 
A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Public 
Choice Society, San Diego, CA, March 25-27, 2002.  The author would like to thank 
James Adams, Lisa Blaydes, Natasha Frantz, Garrett Glasgow, Kent Jennings, Andreas 
Nölke, Jesse Russell, Eric Smith, and Stephen Weatherford for their insightful comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are my own. 
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1. Introduction 
 Anthony Downs (1957) developed a parsimonious spatial model that explained 
what most of the general public in America at the time was observing, namely, that par-
ties and their candidates tended to look similar, in terms of their Left-Right policy views, 
in two-party electoral competition.  This expectation is generally referred to as the con-
vergence prediction. In the wake of Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy, exten-
sive theoretical and empirical research has been dedicated to “fine-tuning” his theory, and 
testing its central prediction regarding candidate convergence; that is, do candidates un-
der plurality two-party competition converge to the median Left-Right voter position in 
order to win elections?1  
From a comparative perspective, this survey of close to 100 Senate Elections is a 
step towards clarifying the relationship between electoral laws and the range of ideologi-
cal choice that is given to voters by competing parties in a political system. The conven-
tional expectation is that multiparty competition, associated with proportional representa-
tion voting systems, allows parties in these systems to take more divergent positions than 
in the two-party elections, which are associated with plurality voting rules. This connec-
tion is acknowledged in an early analysis of voting systems, where F.A. Hermens posits 
that proportional representation made “it natural that there be a party to represent every 
shade of political opinion.  This means that political differences are not only more clearly 
expressed, but multiplied and intensified (Hermens, 1941: 19).” To the degree that con-
vergent or divergent behavior is being revealed in the empirical analyses, this will shed 
empirical light on the relationship between plurality voting rules and the range of ideo-
logical choice for voters in these systems.2    
 While a bulk of literature has been written about the convergence hypothesis, it is 
still worth addressing the issue, namely, because agreement is still lacking regarding its 
validity.  The importance of taking another look at the predictions of the traditional spa-
tial model is that if candidate positioning is unrelated to electoral outcomes then the em-
pirical status of employing this framework to study elections becomes suspect.  Thus the 
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empirical evaluation of any theory that starts from a Downsian framework should in-
variably test the convergence prediction.   
 It is interesting to note that many empirical studies do not support the central 
Downsian prediction of convergence in the American two-party setting. These research-
ers cite as evidence significant differences in the voting records of legislators from the 
two major parties in the U.S. (Fiorina, 1974; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Bullock and 
Brady, 1983; Grofman, Griffen and Glazer, 1990; Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Burden, 
2001a).  In a comparative analysis, Adams & Merrill (2001) study the major candidates’ 
positioning in the 1988 American and French Presidential elections and one of their ma-
jor findings is “candidates’ expected gains from policy moderation would have been quite 
small (12).”   Though, contrary to these findings, in their handbook on spatial modeling 
Enelow and Hinich (1984) analyze the U.S. Presidential contests from 1976 and 1980 and 
conclude “that closeness to the center of the predictive space is an asset in two-candidate 
elections, but one that voters bestow on candidates rather than the other way around 
(222).”  
 On the surface, it is difficult to see how the findings in each set of studies are not 
completely at odds, i.e. how could politicians be rewarded for centrist positioning and 
still take divergent positions?  We present empirical analyses that support exactly this 
notion. More specifically, there is evidence for the Relative Convergence Hypothesis.  
Under relative convergence candidate proximity is assessed in comparison to the ideo-
logical location of her opponent in any single given election.  The hypothesis posits that 
candidates are safe taking noncentrist positions insofar as they remains closer to the mean 
voter position than their opponents.   
 The second central conclusion that emerges here is that divisive primaries hurt 
nominees in their general election races. In a vacuum, the logic of relative convergence 
should, after several iterations, lead electoral competition back to an absolute converging 
of political candidates. The third finding explains why this is not the case - that is, nomi-
nees’ positions polarize if they encounter a competitive primary en route to nomination.  
This polarizing effect combined with the presence of relative convergence would explain 
why candidates who endure competitive primaries tend to lose in their general elections.  
However, we find only the Democratic candidates’ ideological positioning to be system-
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atically affected by the level of primary competition, and in a later section we briefly ex-
plore possible explanations for this finding.      
 The empirical analysis of primary competition is appealing as it offers a wider 
testing ground – primaries are elections too.  The American National Election Study 
(NES): Pooled Senate Data from 1988-92 is used to examine the candidate-voter “link” 
in close to one hundred Senate elections. The study also enables the placement of chal-
lengers on the same ideological continuum.  Another advantage of the NES Pooled Sen-
ate study is that it allows us to place candidates on an ideological scale using the percep-
tions of citizens.  Several empirical studies validate the use of respondents’ ideological 
placements from the Pooled Senate Data.3 Alternative studies employ measures of candi-
dates and/or parties based on: expert-placements (Powell, 2000), roll call voting behavior 
(Burden, 2001b; Ansolabehere et al., 2001), or the close scrutiny of party manifestos 
(Budge, 1994).  However, if one wishes to uncover the determinants of electoral out-
comes, then the use of citizen perceptions appears appropriate, as it is ultimately citizens, 
not experts, who cast Election-Day votes.   
 In the next section, the traditional Downsian spatial model is examined, along 
with its implications for primary competition.  Also, an intuitive logic is set forth explain-
ing why divisive primaries will eventually hurt nominees if the convergence prediction 
holds.  The third section employs the NES Pooled Senate Data from 1988-92, and tests 
the hypotheses concerning convergence.  The fourth section concludes.  
 
 
2. Theory and Predictions 
 H1: (The Relative Convergence Hypothesis) Candidates occupying an ideo-
logical space closer to the mean voter position than their competitors are 
more likely to win their general elections. 
 
 The major tenets of the traditional model of spatial voting have been assumed.4  
In the model, voters cast their ballots for candidates holding policy positions closest to 
their own, in order to maximize their utilities.  These positions are marked along a single 
“liberal - conservative” ideological dimension.  Taken together, politicians are likely to 
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take policy stances closest to the mean voter position in the electorate.  If this is the 
dominant strategy, then we are likely to see candidates converge at the mean voter posi-
tion.  In the absence of absolute convergence, the slightly more nuanced hypothesis of 
relative convergence appears – i.e., the candidate closer to the mean voter position is ex-
pected to gain more votes than her opponent. 
 
 
H2: Candidates appeal to the mean voter position in their partisan constitu-
encies when primary contests are competitive.     
  
 
 The second hypothesis is simply an extension of the first to primary competition. 
If we do not equate the party with the candidate, candidates are more likely to appeal to 
their partisan constituencies only when there is strong primary competition.5  This as-
sumes partisans are to the “left” and “right” of the general electorate.  Figure 1 is a useful 
representation of different distributions of potential voters.  The distributions of respon-
dents identifying themselves with each party are especially significant for the nomination 
process, as opposed to including just party members and elites.  These are the respon-
dents one would expect to vote in primary competitions. Figure 1 shows the mean self-
placements of Democratic partisans, of Republican partisans, and of all survey respon-
dents in the NES Pooled Senate Study.  The Democratic and Republican partisan means 
are, respectively, to the left and right of the center of the general population.  Note that 
this assumption is supported empirically by recent research which finds that in all fifty 
states, the mean positions of Democratic partisans lies to the left of the Republican parti-
san means; and that the Democratic and Republican partisan means in each state lie to the 
left and to the right of the mean voter position, respectively (Grofman et al., 1999). 
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Figure 1: Aggregate Mean Respondent Positions 
 
     Mean Respondent  
            (4.44) 
“Very Liberal”                                                                                              “Very Conservative”     
                                                                                                                             
      (1.00)               (7.00) 
   Mean Democrat  Mean Republican 
          (3.86)          (4.99) 
 
 
 
H3: To the extent that H1 and H2 are supported, competitive primaries hurt can-
didates in general elections because it makes them look more extreme.  
 
 After viewing Figure 1, it is natural to jump to a conclusion supporting party-
divergence.  After all, there is a clear divide between the supporters of each party. How-
ever, the data are aggregated at the national level, and they do not reveal the dynamics of 
specific senate contests.  According to the spatial model, if the candidate’s first priority is 
to get elected, then she will position herself ideologically close to the center of the gen-
eral electorate to maximize her votes.  The calculus for the candidate changes when she 
concerns herself with the nomination of her party.  If she fails to receive the nomination, 
then her chances of victory in the general election are irrelevant.  In a competitive pri-
mary, the dominant strategy will be to move towards the center of the distribution of the 
partisans in the party,6 instead of moving closer to the mean voter position in the general 
electorate.  Doing otherwise will place the nomination in jeopardy.    
 On the other hand, what if a candidate is assured victory in the primary?  In this 
case, the candidate has the leeway to locate near the mean voter position in the general 
electorate.7  In 1996, Bill Clinton had considerable discretion in choosing his platforms 
during the primary season.  Due to advanced polling techniques, he was well-aware that 
there were no serious threats posed to his candidacy.  In this case, why indulge the party?  
Why would Clinton take positions too far to the left and run the risk of being labeled a 
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liberal?  Asking these questions is, in effect, answering them – Clinton remained in office 
for two terms as a “New Democrat.” 
 However, potential nominees with credible competitors cannot afford the same 
discretion in choosing their policy-stances. Candidates who endure competitive primaries 
must cater to the centers of their parties in order to consolidate support for their nomina-
tions. John Aldrich draws attention to the inherent dilemma for candidates, “between ap-
pealing for general election support by moving toward the policy center of the whole 
electorate and appealing for the nomination support by moving toward the center of the 
party activists (Aldrich, 1995: 190).”  
Aldrich pursues the influence of activists, but what about competition during the 
primary?  If party activists hold strong liberal and conservative positions, and politicians 
are dependent on activists for support, then the claim is correct – activists “pull” candi-
dates away from the mean voter position in the general electorate.  If activists do have 
polarizing effects on parties, under what circumstances do they have more or less influ-
ence over the positions of their candidates?  For that matter, when do rank and file party 
supporters, i.e. the kind who vote in primaries, have more or less of an effect on candi-
date positions? The third hypothesis asserts that the party’s pull is stronger when candi-
dates face competitive primaries.8  Notice this prediction assumes that sincere voting, as 
opposed to strategic voting, occurs in primary elections - specifically, partisan voters 
value a candidates’ ideological closeness over those which have a higher likelihood of 
victory in the general election.    
A natural response to the above predictions is to posit the simple scenario of can-
didates pandering to their parties in the primaries, and then switching their positions dur-
ing the general elections to appeal to broader segments of the electorate.  Another built-in 
assumption of the model is that candidate movement is accompanied by heavy electoral 
costs.  Barry Burden (2001b) alludes to this practice as, “Post-Primary Moderation,” and 
clarifies why this strategy is ultimately self-defeating.  If there are interested parties who 
gain from uncovering discrepancies or dramatic shifts in candidates’ positions throughout 
the duration of their campaigns, then candidates will be less likely to alter their positions.  
Clearly, the opposition has the most visible interests in doing so.  Interest groups and the 
media are also sources of “whistle-blowing.”  Position switching hurts candidates’ credi-
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bility with voters (Hinich and Munger, 1994), and it develops uncertainty about them 
(Alvarez, 1996).  Thus, Burden (2001b: 111) warns candidates about the “stickiness” of 
their positions and states, “Candidates face a trade-off between the centripetal logic of the 
spatial model and the real possibility that moving to the center might lose votes.”   
In toto, the three hypotheses construct a causal chain linking outcomes in primary 
competition to the outcomes in general elections.  Previous work in this area includes the 
analysis of Robert Bernstein (1977) of the effects of divisive primaries in Senate races 
from 1956-1972.  Simply, he concludes divisive primaries hurt candidates.  The study 
correlates the margins of victory in congressional primaries with the likelihood of winning 
the general election.  A primary is considered divisive if the victor’s next best opponent 
came within twenty percentage points.  Bernstein controls for “incumbency,” “one-party 
states,” “unbalanced state competition,” and “two-party states” and in each instance, a 
candidate is more likely to lose if she is involved in a “divisive” primary.9  What Bern-
stein does not explain is why divisive primaries hurt candidates in their general elec-
tions.10    
Barry Burden (2001b) suggests an answer – competitive primaries are more likely 
to involve polarized candidates.  Using roll call voting data from the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives in 1992, Burden uses the NOMINATE procedure developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997) to position House members.  Based on their records of roll call voting, 
he finds that House members who face an opponent in their primaries vote more radically 
on legislation than their counterparts without primary opposition.  Though Burden is 
hesitant to infer a causal relationship, this potentially explains why these candidates do 
not fare well in general elections – competitive primaries cause candidates to look more 
extreme by causing them to make appeals to their parties’ faithful in order to receive their 
nominations.  
  The discussion leaves us then with several intriguing empirical questions:  Are 
candidates rewarded when they take positions closer to - or farther away from the mean 
voter position?  Do competitive primaries polarize candidates?   Do competitive prima-
ries hurt candidates in their general elections?  Finally, do competitive primaries hurt 
candidates in their general elections because they force candidates to appeal to the ideo-
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logical “wings” of their parties?  The following section casts empirical light on the 
above questions. Thus far, the general model looks like: 
A) primary divisiveness  B) perceived candidate distance from the mean voter position 
 C) probability of victory in the general election. 
 
3. Data, Methods, and Empirical Findings 
A probit equation is developed estimating the links between A & C and B & C 
(referring to the model above).  The data used to test the model was primarily found in 
the NES Pooled Senate Study from 1988-92.  This study enabled us to gather voter per-
ceptions of both competing candidates in ninety-three Senate Elections.  The surveys 
cover approximately seventy respondents in each Senate race.  The respondents are asked 
to place themselves and each of their senate candidates on a seven-point Likert scale, 
with “1” corresponding to “very liberal,” and “7” with “very conservative.”  After com-
puting the mean positions11 for the constituencies of each state, and the respondents’ 
mean candidate placements, it is possible to determine how distant a candidate is from 
her constituency’s mean position for each senate race.12  By computing almost one hun-
dred separate constituency means, these analyses benefit from isolating the dynamics in 
each individual election.  Additionally, senate primary and general election vote returns 
were collected from Congressional Quarterly.  In determining the margin of victory in 
the primary election, the runner-up’s percentage of the vote is subtracted from the share 
of the nominee.   
As opposed to merely looking at an individual candidate, and her chances of win-
ning, the analysis accounts for her chances of winning – given her opponent’s scores on 
each of a set of key explanatory factors.  The suffix “Diff” is part of the label for each of 
the three key variables as it is the differences between candidate distance (CanDiff), party 
distance (PartyDiff), and primary divisiveness (MarginDiff) that are central to the calcu-
lations.13  The mean perceived party distance is an additional control to see if voters re-
spond to general party positioning, instead of particular candidate placements.  Incum-
bency effects (Open and RepInc) are also measured.  I therefore estimated the following 
probit equation: 
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Probability of victory in the general election for the Republican candidate = b1 +        
 
b2 (Dd – Dr) + b3 (Mr - Md) + b4 (Pd – Pr) + b5 (Oi) + b6 (Ri)                   ,                 (1)    
                  |                       |                      |                  |              | 
            Candiff         MarginDiff      PartyDiff      Open     Republican Incumbent 
 
 
where, Dd and Dr represent the distance between the Democratic candidate and the mean 
voter position, and the distance between the Republican candidate and the mean voter 
position, respectively.  Mr and Md are the margins of victory in the primary elections for 
each of the candidates. Pd and Pr are the mean perceived positions of the Democratic and 
Republican parties. Finally Oi and Ri are binary variables indicating whether or not the 
contested seat in election i is open or held by a Republican Incumbent.14 The variables 
are constructed so each coefficient (except for “Open”) is expected to be positive. 
Column 1, Table 1 presents the estimated parameters for the above probit specifi-
cation.  The relative difference in candidate positions is positive and significant at the .05 
level.  Translated, Republicans increase their odds of winning the general election if they 
are closer to their mean constituent positions than their Democratic opponents, thus 
showing strong support for the Relative Convergence Hypothesis (H1).  On the other 
hand, the coefficient for the difference in mean perceived party positions (PartyDiff) is 
positive as expected, yet it does not reach statistical significance. Accordingly, we are 
unable to accept an alternative explanation of general election outcomes that focuses on 
the perceived positions of parties. In addition, the coefficients for open races and Repub-
lican Incumbency are positive and significant at the .01 level.  
Column 3, Table 1 reports results for regression analyses based upon the specifi-
cation identical to equation 1 except that here the dependent variable is the Republican 
candidate’s share of the two-candidate vote. The estimated coefficients for this analysis 
support substantive conclusions that are identical to those based on the probit analysis 
reported above.  
The advanced specifications convey that relative primary divisiveness is not an 
explanatory factor. The basic specifications in columns 2 and 4 in Table 1 are presented 
to address this point - i.e., they show a strong statistical relationship emerges when the 
incumbency variables are omitted from the equation.  This suggests an issue of collinear-
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ity exists in the initial specification, and incumbency is marginalizing the effects of divi-
sive primaries.  Incumbents endure less primary competition than their eventual challeng-
ers in general elections.  On average, Democratic and Republican Incumbents, respec-
tively, win their primaries by 24 and 31 percentage points more than their challengers in 
the general elections.15  Accordingly, this supports the notion that relative primary divi-
siveness affects outcomes in the general elections, though filtered through incumbency. 
One implication of this finding is that part of the advantage of incumbency is a less com-
petitive primary election.   
 
Table 1: Estimating Senate Election Outcomes (for Republican Candidates) 
 
     Probit           Regression  
 
Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in the  
regression analysis is the Republican’s vote share of the two-party vote. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed test. 
 
Coefficients 
Advanced 
(1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Advanced 
(3) 
Basic 
(4) 
Constant -1.49** 
(.32) 
-.38* 
(.16) 
38.67** 
(1.33) 
46.54** 
(1.16) 
Relative Candidate 
Distance 
(CanDiff) 
.723* 
(.36) 
1.12** 
(.30) 
3.53* 
(1.80) 
8.46** 
(2.17) 
Relative Primary Divi-
siveness 
(MarginDiff) 
.002 
(.004) 
.01** 
(.003) 
-.004 
(.02) 
.08** 
(.02) 
Relative Party Distance 
(PartyDiff) 
.54 
(1.21) 
.59 
(.97) 
5.05 
(5.78) 
6.35 
(7.35) 
Open 1.56** 
(.50) 
 12.74** 
(2.58) 
 
Republican  
Incumbent 
2.35** 
(.46) 
 18.37** 
(2.33) 
 
N 93 93 93 93 
Log Likelihood -31.83 -47.68   
Chi-squared 64.39** 32.68**   
Adjusted R2 
  
.56 .24 
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To this point we have not explored the hypothesis that competitive primaries af-
fect general elections by causing nominees to occupy more extreme positions, i.e., the 
link between A and B at the end of section 2 still needs to be addressed.  The theory pre-
dicts an inverse relationship between the divisiveness in primaries and candidate dis-
tances.  That is, as the margin of victory in the primary decreases, the candidate distance 
should increase. Table 2, column 1 directly addresses the relationship by regressing the 
candidate distance to the mean state voter position on the candidate’s margin of victory in 
the primary election.  The coefficient is negative and significant at the .05 level.  
However, columns 2-5, Table 2 demonstrate that the Democratic Candidates are 
driving this finding.  The coefficient estimates reported in columns 2 and 3, Table 2 dis-
play a relationship exists for Democratic candidates, but not for Republicans.  Democrats 
are perceived as taking stances closer to their mean voter positions in the general elector-
ate when they emerge from less contentious primaries.  The magnitude of the coefficient 
almost doubles for Democrats who run opposed in their primaries, as shown in Column 4, 
Table 2. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical story – Democrats won more 
elections than the Republicans during the time-period of the study (i.e. in a Waltzian 
sense, the Democrats are adapting better to their electoral environment than Republicans, 
and thus are winning more elections).  Essentially, Democrats “fit’ the general model bet-
ter than Republicans, and they also tend to win more elections.   
Why this dichotomy exists between parties is possibly a temporal feature of the 
analysis. In the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, an increasing number of members of the Democ-
ratic Party were influenced by the “New Democrat” ideology that emphasized neo-liberal 
market ideals, and general policy centrism.  As mentioned above, the early ‘90s Bill Clin-
ton exemplifies New Democrat ideology. Therefore the New Democrats in the Democ-
ratic Party adopted centrist positions in general elections if they were fortunate enough to 
easily emerge from their primary competitions. This observational difference between 
parties implies more strategic and flexible position-taking by the Democrats - and ideo-
logical rigidity on the part of Republicans.  
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Table 2: Coefficients for Primary Margin of Victory, When Estimating Proximity 
 
        Omitting Unopposed Candidates 
                    (Columns 4 & 5) 
 
 
Coefficients 
All Candidates 
(1) 
Democrats 
(2) 
Republicans 
(3) 
Democrats 
(4) 
Republicans 
(5) 
Constant .72** 
(.05) 
.84**  
(.08) 
.57** 
(.07) 
.90** 
(.09) 
.61** 
(.09) 
Primary Mar-
gin of Victory 
-.0019* 
(.0007) 
-.0028** 
(.001) 
-.0006 
(.0009) 
-.0053** 
(.0017) 
-.002 
(.002) 
N 186 93 93 57 54 
Adjusted R2 .03 .06 0 .12 .003 
 
Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute 
measure of the ideological distances between candidates and their constituency means.  
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 3 proceeds from the initial probit analysis with a test of “first differences” 
(King, 1989), which determines the precise effects of the independent variables on the 
likelihood of a Republican victory.  The “baseline” category in Table 3 holds the inde-
pendent variables at their mean values, and estimates the probabilities of a Republican 
victory.  Changing the values of the independent variables establishes the impact of each 
explanatory factor on the outcome.  As the probability approaches one, the chances of a 
Republican win increases; and vice-versa, as the probability approaches zero, the prob-
ability of a Democratic win increases. 
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The baseline probabilities predictably indicate incumbency has a strong effect on 
the likelihood of a Republican victory.  Using increments of one half a standard devia-
tion, probabilities are generated for the effects of the independent variables on a Republi-
can victory.  Table 3 confirms Relative candidate distance has a substantial impact on the 
outcome. Regardless of the “type of race,” Republican candidates increase their likeli-
hood of victory as their relative proximity to the mean constituent position increases.   
Regardless of the type of race (i.e. controlling for incumbency), there are pro-
found proximity effects. As the Democratic candidate moves closer to the middle, and the 
value of relative candidate distance drops one standard deviation below its mean, the Re-
publican’s chances of victory drops: by four percent in races with a Democratic incum-
bent, fourteen percent in open elections, and ten percent in elections where the Republi-
can is an incumbent.  The reverse story is true for elections where the Republican candi-
date is closer to the constituency mean position than her Democratic opponent (i.e. +σ), 
where the probabilities for a Republican victory increase by .08 in races with Democratic 
incumbents, .14 in open races, and .08 in races with Republican incumbents.16     
Table 3 also reveals that open elections amplify these centripetal tendencies.17  As 
the value of relative candidate distance changes, the predicted probabilities of victory 
radically change. There is an impressive swing (from -σ through +σ) in probabilities for 
open elections of .28.  If open contests are more competitive than those including incum-
bents, this outcome is to be expected.  Competition enhances the incentives to conform to 
electoral pressures so the effects of the explanatory factors should increase under these 
circumstances.18  
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Table 3: Effects of Candidate Distance, Primary Margin of Victory, Party Position, 
and Incumbency on the Probability of a Republican Victory. 
 
     Type of Race (Incumbency) 
 
Independent   Democratic  Open   Republican
 
Baseline (all values  .08   .57   .83 
held at µ) 
 
Candidate Distance 
(Democrat – Republican) 
+  1 σ   .16   .71   .91 
+  ½ σ   .11   .64   .88 
- ½  σ   .06   .50   .78 
- 1 σ   .04   .43   .73 
 
Difference   .12   .28   .18 
 
Primary Margin 
(Republican – Democrat) 
+ σ    .10   .54   .83 
- σ    .07   .61   .81 
Difference   .03   .07   .02 
 
Party  
Distance 
+ σ    .10   .60   .85  
- σ    .07   .54   .81 
Difference   .03   .06   .04   
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4. Conclusion  
Candidates perceived as closer than their opponents to the mean policy positions 
in their constituencies are greatly advantaged in the general elections. There is a moderat-
ing influence in senate elections – i.e. candidates increase their chances of victory if they 
are perceived as more moderate than their opponents.  This dynamic of senate elections 
has been referred to here as relative convergence.19  
Divisive primaries are a burden to candidates.  Additionally, incumbents benefit 
from experiencing less competitive primaries than their challengers in their general elec-
tions.  The re-orienting of the mean voter position in primary elections should induce 
candidates to take more extreme positions when the primary is competitive.  The empiri-
cal evidence suggests this is the case, though exclusively for Democratic candidates. Per-
haps, this finding could use more exploration to fully understand why Democrats and Re-
publicans are responding differently to the same electoral environment.   
There are a few direct implications for the electoral strategies of parties and can-
didates, although these are possibly unsettling when viewed in light of some of our popu-
lar democratic principles.  For the party, one of the main tasks is to limit intra-party com-
petition, because the strategy used to win a battle for nomination could very well leave a 
candidate in a quandary when it comes time to compete in the general election.  For the 
candidate the optimal strategy is keeping a watchful eye on the opponent, expressing non-
centrist ideological preferences only to the extent these stances remain less extreme than 
those of the competition.   
 16
 
Appendix: Variable Construction 
 
 
Deriving the Components of the Key Variables 
 
• The survey asks each respondent to place him/herself on a seven-point scale.  For each elec-
tion in each state, the constituency mean is computed by averaging all of the respondents’ 
self-placement scores. 
• Respondents were asked to place the candidates on the same seven-point scale (“1” being the 
most liberal; and “7”- the most conservative).  The candidate mean is determined by averag-
ing the responses within each state.    
• The party mean is developed in a similar fashion.  Respondents answer the question on the 
survey asking them with which party they associate themselves.  The mean is computed by 
averaging self-placement scores for each set of respondents identifying with each party. 
• The percentage difference in votes in the primary election between the nominee and the next 
best challenger is the margin of victory in the primary.   
• The margin of victory in the general election is measured by taking the percentage differ-
ence between the winner and the runner-up.   
• The absolute value of the difference between the candidate and the constituency mean is the 
candidate’s distance from the constituency mean. 
• The absolute value of the difference between the party and constituency means is the party’s 
distance from the constituency mean. 
 
 
Key Variables 
 
• CanDiff (relative candidate distance) is the Republican’s perceived distance from the con-
stituency mean subtracted from the Democrat’s perceived distance.  A positive result indi-
cates the Democrat is perceived as farther from the mean than the Republican. 
• MarginDiff (relative primary divisiveness) is the Margin of victory in the Republican candi-
date’s primary minus the margin for the Democratic candidate. Positive values indicate the 
Republican emerged from her primary with a larger margin of victory than her Democratic 
counterpart. 
• PartyDiff (relative party distance) is derived by subtracting the Republican Party’s perceived 
distance from the constituency mean from the Democratic Party’s perceived distance.  Again, 
a positive number indicates the Democratic Party is perceived as farther from the constitu-
ency mean. 
 
 
Variables in the Alternative Specification 
 
• Partisan Advantage is the proportion of respondents in each state who identify with the Re-
publican Party minus the proportion identifying with the Democrats.  
• Candidate Quality gauges whether or not the candidate in the general election has held prior 
office. The score of the Democrat is subtracted from that of the Republican.  The possible 
values are -1, 0, or 1.       
• A dichotomous variable identifies unopposed candidates in their primaries. Again, the Democ-
rat’s score is subtracted from that of the Republican. The possible values are -1, 0, or 1.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The “median voter result” is based on deterministic voting in two-candidate elections (Black, 
1958). Alternatively, vote choice under probabilistic voting leads to convergence at the mean 
voter position (Enelow and Hinich, 1984).  
2
 Furthermore, the study has implications for other democracies that are considering popular pri-
maries (e.g. in Latin America, popular primaries are increasingly being used for candidate selec-
tion). To the extent that the selection of candidates is competitive, this study implies that party 
ideologies will be more extreme than otherwise.    
3
 Burden et al (2000) find a strong correlation between respondents’ perceptions of candidates’ 
ideological positions - and several other measures of candidate ideology (e.g. roll-call voting 
analyses, interest group ratings, and legislator and candidate interviews).  Furthermore, Gershten-
son (2001) validates the measure of respondents' ideological self-placements in relation to their 
candidate placements.  
4
 For general objections to the spatial model, see Green and Shapiro (1994).  
5
 Downs (1957: 25-26) characterizes parties as teams of men seeking to gain office.  Among sev-
eral reasons to question this assumption, there are three in particular: the parties’ decreasing con-
trol over resources for campaigns, the candidate-centered nature of media coverage, and popular 
nomination rules.  Candidates are not obligated to exchange with their party leaders, policy posi-
tions for campaign-capital (i.e. labor and money).  Popular primaries induce candidates to cater 
to the public - not the party - when they run for public office.  If there is a discrepancy between 
the party’s ideology, and a more advantageous electoral position, the candidate has the ability to 
shift towards the latter.   
6
 The candidate’s spatial strategy for winning the primary election may vary depending on the 
number of competitive primary candidates.  If the candidate faces a single competitive primary 
opponent – so that the primary is essentially a two-candidate race – then she may have incentives 
to locate near the mean partisan position.  Matters are more complex if the primary features three 
or more competitive candidates (see, e.g., Cox 1990).  Nevertheless, to the extent that the spatial 
distribution of the party’s partisans is significantly different from that of the general electorate, 
competitive primaries should still pull candidates away from the center of the general election 
voter distribution.   
7
 Though the argument suggests candidates choose moderate positions to maximize their vote 
shares, it is completely conceivable they would base their platforms on other factors (i.e. sincere 
preferences).  Even if this is the case, ceteris paribus, the winner is more likely to be closer to the 
mean voter position.  
8
 The public perceives divergent policies for both candidates and their parties.  Even if we do not 
see candidates actually converge, we should expect the candidate perceived as closer to the mid-
dle to win the general election.  Studies of roll call voting in Congress have affirmed that parties 
do take divergent positions (Aldrich, 1995; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001).   
9
 Bernstein concedes that 20 points is an arbitrary definition of “divisive.” Also, in controlling for 
each of these variables, the number of cases in each category is limited causing a “small n” prob-
lem with generalizing the results.   
10
 The majority of work in the divisive primary literature focuses on the effects on campaigns and 
activists in presidential elections (see, e.g. Lengle, 1980, Stone, 1986, 1991; Stone, Atkeson, & 
Rapoport, 1992).  Several studies consider the congressional and gubernatorial levels as well (see, 
e.g. Bernstein, 1977; Born, 1981; Kenney & Rice, 1984; Ezra, 2001).  
11
 The Downsian model predicts candidates converge at the median voter; not the mean voter po-
sition.  In Melvin Hinich’s, “Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result Is an Arti-
fact,” he validates the use of the mean.  In most empirical work, the mean and the median are vir-
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tually identical.  Several modelers use the mean, instead of the median (Alvarez, 1996; Enelow & 
Hinich, 1984). 
12
 Respondents had a more difficult time placing the candidates on the seven-point scale than just 
placing themselves on the scale, and accordingly, candidate distances are a result of approxi-
mately 25-40 responses.   
13
 The measure of relative primary divisiveness is the same as the one used by Kenney and Rice 
(1987).   
14
 The appendix includes descriptions of the variables in this specification.  
15
 The “difference in means” test is significant at the .001 level. 
16
 Again, relative primary divisiveness does have a considerable impact on election outcomes.  
When generating a test of first differences that leaves out incumbency, Republicans won an aver-
age of 42.6% of the races in the analysis. As the value of relative primary divisiveness increases 
to one standard deviation above its mean - signifying the candidate is less impeded in obtaining 
his party’s nomination than his competition - the probability of victory increases to 64.8%.  Con-
versely, when the value of relative primary divisiveness drops a standard deviation below its 
mean, the probability of winning for the Republican candidate plummets to 22.6%.  
17
 This terminology is similar to that of Cox (1990), where he refers to moderating factors as cen-
tripetal incentives. 
18
 An alternative specification has also been estimated verifying that the substantive results do not 
change when additional factors are taken into consideration, such as partisan advantage, candidate 
quality, and a dichotomous variable controlling for the effects of unopposed candidates in their 
primary elections.  In this specification, the coefficients for relative candidate distance and rela-
tive primary divisiveness actually increase in magnitude, and reach statistical significance at the 
.01 level. Descriptions of these variables are presented in the appendix.   
19
 Note, relative convergence does not preclude candidates from divergent position-taking. 
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